Persistence and Amplification of Financial Frictions by Shirai, Daichi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Persistence and Amplification of
Financial Frictions
Daichi Shirai
The Canon Institute for Global Studies
8 June 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72187/
MPRA Paper No. 72187, posted 25 June 2016 02:58 UTC
Persistence and Ampliﬁcation of Financial Frictions ¤
Daichi Shiraiy
June 8, 2016
Abstract
We quantitatively evaluate the various types of working capital loans aﬀected by bor-
rowing constraints using a simple real business cycle model. We explore which borrowing
constraints generate persistence and/or ampliﬁed output responses to productivity and
ﬁnancial shocks. We ﬁnd that limiting investment on account of borrowing constraints
generates a persistent response to a one-time transitory shock. This ﬁnding implies that
investment wedge plays an important role in generating persistence. There is a trade-oﬀ
relationship between persistence and ampliﬁcation among models and the working capital
loan channel does not always generate ampliﬁcation.
Keywords: Financing frictions, Business cycle propagation, Persistence, Business cycle
accounting,
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E37, E44, G01
1 Introduction
The standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used during the Great
Moderation, such as those of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007), do not employ ﬁnancial friction, with some exceptions.1 These models
assume that the ﬁnancial market is perfect. However, after the Great Recession, ﬁnancial
market imperfection has become a major topic of discussion in macroeconomics, monetary
¤I am extremely grateful to Keiichiro Kobayashi and Yosuke Takeda for many helpful comments and sug-
gestions. I also thank Masashige Hamano, Masaru Inaba and Kengo Nutahara for helpful comments.
yThe Canon Institute for Global Studies. Email: shirai.daichi@canon-igs.org
1For example, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003) introduce a Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
borrowing constraint in their medium-scale DSGE model.
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economics, and ﬁnance. Moreover, to understand the mechanism of a ﬁnancial crisis, an im-
portant assumption in the DSGE model is ﬁnancial market imperfection. Particularly, many
authors introduce ﬁnancial friction to study ﬁnancial crisis.
The recent macroeconomic studies considering ﬁnancial friction can roughly be classiﬁed
under two frameworks. The ﬁrst is the costly state veriﬁcation framework, developed by
Townsend (1979), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke
et al. (1999). In this framework, there exists asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders and lenders are required to incur monitoring costs to verify the borrower’s realized
return on capital. The borrowing constraint is derived from the optimal contract between
the borrower and lender. Many DSGE studies have introduced the Bernanke et al. (1999)
type of friction; for example, see Christiano et al. (2003), Gilchrist and Saito (2008), von Hei-
deken (2009), Del Negro and Schorfheide (2013), Muto, Sudo and Yoneyama (2013), Iiboshi,
Matsumae and Nishiyama (2014), and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014). This type of
ﬁnancial friction can generate a suﬃciently large ampliﬁcation of monetary policy shocks but
not of productivity shocks.
The second framework is the borrowing constraint due to lack of commitment, a` la Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997). Hart and Moore (1994) developed an incomplete contract model,
assuming that the borrower can threaten repudiation and renegotiate repayment to the lender.
In other words, borrowers do not commit to repay their debt. This assumption sets the upper
limit of borrowing. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce a borrowing constraint that is a
special case of Hart and Moore (1994), in the general equilibrium model. Besides Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), many applications use the Hart and Moore (1994) framework; for example,
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Hirano and Yanagawa (2010), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (2012), and Perri and Quadrini (2014). Following Hart and Moore (1994),
numerous models with the borrowing constraint assume lack of commitment.
Our study focuses on the borrowing constraints due to lack of commitment. We sum-
marize the various types of borrowing constraint and investigate them quantitatively using
the Jermann and Quadrini (2012a) (JQ henceforth) model, which is a real business cycle
(RBC) model with ﬁnancial friction. This economy has perfect information, but there is no
heterogeneity between agents, debt contracts are incomplete, and ﬁrms can default on their
debt due to lack of commitment; thus, ﬁrms face the borrowing constraint.2 We characterize
and summarize various types of borrowing constraints quantitatively with this simple DSGE
2We do not cover household credit market imperfections, such as Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and R´ıos-
Rull (2007), Nakajima and R´ıos-Rull (2014), and Huo and Rios-Rull (2015). This issue is also important and
we will consider it in a future work.
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model. In particular, we consider combinations of the variables ﬁnanced as working capital
loans before production takes place. Working capital loans are used for several purposes: wage
payments, investment, equity payout, and debt repurchase. We consider various combinations
of these expenditures that are aﬀected by the borrowing constraint. These various types of
borrowing constraints are derived from lack of commitment.
In this study, we speciﬁcally focus on the persistence and ampliﬁcation of output. Fol-
lowing the Great Recession, many studies are now interested in the adverse long-term eﬀects
of ﬁnancial crisis. However, the results of many of these models crucially depend on the per-
sistence of shocks. It is not clear as to why these shocks are so persistent. In this study, we
show how only ﬁnancial friction can explain the facts of business cycles and ﬁnancial crises.
Recently, some studies have for the ﬁrst time considered the mechanism of persistence re-
cession more deeply. Kobayashi and Shirai (2016b) shows that a one-time exogenous shock
can replicate productivity slowdown, such as during Japan’s “lost two decades.” Following
an exogenous shock, a proportion of ﬁrms own substantial debt, but there is no change in
structural parameters. Substantial debt tightens the borrowing constraint persistently. This
situation is considered a ﬁnancial crisis.
We ﬁnd that when an investment is aﬀected by the borrowing constraint, the model gen-
erates a persistent output response to shock. When the borrowing constraint is tight and
binding, the ﬁrm may want to relax the borrowing constraint, but it will be diﬃcult to do
so. There are only two ways to relax the borrowing constraint: increase the net worth, and
decrease the working capital loans. To relax the borrowing constraint by accumulating cap-
ital stock (net worth), more working capital ﬁnance would be required, but this borrowing
would be diﬃcult because the borrowing constraint will become more tight. In addition, if the
payment of wages and investment are aﬀected by the borrowing constraint, the persistence
of output would become more strong. When the payment of wages and investment are con-
strained, it aﬀects the interaction between them through the borrowing constraint and this
propagates the shock.
We also consider the hump-shaped response of output in this study. We ﬁnd that for the
hump-shaped response, both persistence of shock and the countercyclical response of wedges
are required. Previous studies argue that the hump-shaped response requires some additional
propagation mechanisms. In addition, our ﬁnding implies that the hump-shaped response of
output also requires the countercyclical response of wedges.
We also ﬁnd that the working capital channel does not always generate strong ampli-
ﬁcation. This ﬁnding contradicts the results of Inaba and Kobayashi (2009) and Mendoza
(2010). They show that working capital loans are aﬀected by the borrowing constraint and
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that the working capital loan channel generates ampliﬁcation. Our result implies that some
other additional mechanism is needed for the working capital loans channel to generate strong
ampliﬁcation.
Some excellent surveys of ﬁnancial frictions can be found in the literature. For example,
see Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Quadrini (2011), Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov
(2013), and Gertler, Kiyotaki and Prestipino (2016). Quadrini (2011) and Brunnermeier
et al. (2013) are deeply related to our study. Quadrini (2011) summarizes theoretically the
literature since the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
using a simple two periods model. Brunnermeier et al. (2013) surveys a wider range of the
macroeconomic implications of ﬁnancial frictions that include some ﬁelds of macroeconomics,
ﬁnance, and general equilibrium theory. Our work complements these works with quantitative
experiments of various types of borrowing constraints.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the benchmark model. This model is
identical to the basic JQ model. Section 3 introduces various types of borrowing constraints.
Using these borrowing constraints, Section 4 examines the persistence and ampliﬁcation of
output. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
We use a JQ model that is in fact an RBC model with ﬁnancial friction. This model is identical
to the basic JQ model. Time is discrete and continues from 0 to inﬁnity: t = 0; 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;1.
There are two agents in this model: ﬁrms and households. Firms face the borrowing constraint.
Our paper’s aim is to consider various types of borrowing constraints and compare them
quantitatively. In this section, we introduce the basic JQ model. In the next section, we
introduce some other types of borrowing constraints.
2.1 Firms
Consider a unit mass of homogeneous ﬁrms. A ﬁrm borrows intra-period loans, l, and inter-
period loans, b, subject to the borrowing constraint. Suppose that the ﬁrm holding capital
stock k and owing debt b at the beginning of period borrows an intra-period loan. The intra-
period loan is used as working capital that is required at the beginning of the period for
payments before the realization of revenue and is repaid with no interest at the end of the
period. In the basic JQ model, working capital loans are used for new capital investment,
wage payments, equity payouts, and repayment of debt prior to production. In this case, the
intra-period loan is equal to the ﬁrm’s revenue (production), l = F (z; k; n).
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The ﬁrm also borrows intra-period debt b at the eﬀective gross interest rate, R = 1+r(1¡
¿), where r is the interest rate and ¿ is the tax beneﬁt. Debt is preferred to equity because
of tax beneﬁts.
As Hart and Moore (1994) assume, a ﬁrm can counterfactually default repayment of intra-
period debts after the realization of revenue but before repaying the intra-period loan. Once
the ﬁrm defaults, the lender can seize the capital stock with probability ». Thus, the lender
imposes an enforcement constraint on the ﬁrm,
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ l = F (z; k; n); (1)
where n is the labor input and » follows the AR(1) process ln »0 = ½» ln »+ (1¡ ½») ln »¤+ e»;
here, 0 · ½» · 1, »¤ is the steady-state value of » and e» is i.i.d. with standard deviations ¾z.
In this study, we call these stochastic innovations, e», “ﬁnancial shocks.”
In this economy, there are two macro shocks, productivity shocks (ez) and ﬁnancial shocks
(e»). Since there is no idiosyncratic shock, no heterogeneity exists between ﬁrms and we only
consider symmetric equilibrium. The optimization problem of a ﬁrm is
V (s; k; b) = max
d;n;k0;b0
©
d+ Em0V (s0; k0; b0)
ª
;
subject to the borrowing constraint (1) and budget constraint
(1¡ ±)k + F (z; k; n)¡ wn+ b
0
R
= b+ '(d) + k0; (2)
where V (s; k; b) is the cum-dividend market value of the ﬁrm, s = (z; ») is the aggregate state,
± is the depreciation rate of capital, F (z; k; n) = y = zkµn1¡µ is the production (revenue), z
is a productivity that follows an AR(1) process, ln z0 = ½z ln z+(1¡½z) ln z¤+ez, 0 · ½z · 1,
z¤ is the steady-state value of z, ez is the productivity shock i.i.d. with standard deviations
¾z, w is the wage rate, m0 ´ ¯CC0 is the stochastic discount factor derived from household
optimization, '(d) ´ d+·(d¡ d)2 is the gross dividend consisting of the equity payout d and
adjustment cost ·(d¡ d¯)2, and the prime denotes next-period value. This adjustment cost is
the deadweight loss equal to zero in the steady state. In the special case when · = 0, this
economy is equivalent to a frictionless economy. Here, ﬁrms can costlessly issue new equities
that deny the role of ﬁnancial friction. We compare this frictionless case to our ﬁnancial
friction models quantitatively.
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The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) for the ﬁrm’s problem are
d : ! =
1
'd(d)
;
n : (1¡ µ) y
n
= w
µ
1
1¡ ¹'d(d)
¶
;
k0 : Em0
'd(d)
'd0(d0)
½
1¡ ± + £1¡ ¹0'd0(d0)¤ µy0
k0
¾
+ »¹'d(d) = 1;
b0 : REm0
'd(d)
'd0(d0)
+ »¹'d(d)
R
1 + r
= 1; (3)
where ! and ¹ are the Lagrange multiplier for ﬂow of fund and the borrowing constraint,
respectively.
In the steady state, solving (3) for ¹¤ yields
¹¤ =
1
»¤
µ
1
¯R¤
¡ 1
¶
;
where R = 1 + r(1 ¡ ¿) and the asterisk (¤) denotes steady-state variables. If and only if
¿ = 0, the borrowing constraint is not binding. We assume throughout that ¿ > 0 and the
borrowing constraint is always binding.
2.2 Households
A unit mass of households consume, provide labor, and save to maximize the utility function
max
c; n; b0; s0
E0
1X
t=0
¯t [ln c+ ® ln(1¡ n)] ;
subject to the budget constraint
wn+ b+ s(d+ p) =
b0
1 + r
+ s0p+ c+ T;
where ¯ is the discount factor, c is consumption, n is labor supply, b is a one-period bond, s
represents equity shares, p is the market price of shares, T = BR ¡ B
0
1+r is the lump-sum tax
ﬁnancing the tax beneﬁts of ﬁrm debts, and B is the aggregated inter-period debt b.
The FOCs are
c : ¸ =
1
c
;
n : w =
®c
1¡ n;
b0 :
1
c(1 + r)
= E0
¯
c0
;
s0 :
p
c
= ¯E0
µ
d0 + p0
c0
¶
;
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where ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier of budget constraint. We summarize the system of dy-
namics in Appendix 8.1.
2.3 Business cycle accounting
We also measure the eﬃciency wedge (EW), labor wedge (LW), and investment wedge (IW)
by applying the business cycle accounting (BCA) method of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2007). BCAs decompose output ﬂuctuations into wedges that are distortions caused by taxes,
frictions, and policies. In Appendix 7, we deﬁne the three wedges using a prototype RBC
model. The EW is identical to TFP and TFP follows an exogenous process in our model.
Thus, we mainly focus on LW and IW.
Chari et al. (2007) investigate the Great Depression using BCAs and conclude that a
sharp decline in output during the Great Depression can be largely accounted by LW and
EW deteriorations. IW is a minor source of business cycles and ﬁnancial crises. Kobayashi
and Inaba (2006) and Otsu (2011) also ﬁnd that the lost two decades of the Japanese economy
can be explained by LW deterioration and TFP slowdown. Brinca (2014) shows that EW and
LW can replicate business cycle ﬂuctuations for many OECD countries. A sharp decline in
LW was also observed in the US economy during the 2008–2010 global ﬁnancial crisis (see
Pescatori and Tasci, 2011).
BCA can be used for the criteria by which a model is better to explain facts. If we
follow this criteria by using BCA, the borrowing constraints of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
and Bernanke et al. (1999) are not good models because these models do not generate LW
deterioration and IW deterioration leads to a decreasing output. This result is inconsistent
with data. However, Inaba and Nutahara (2009) point out a problem with these criteria. They
conclude that IW is not the main driving force behind output but leads to the persistence
of output. Output persistency is one of the important features of empirical business cycles.
BCA does not capture this role. In this paper, we consider numerical experiments with the
following result in mind.
3 Financial friction
In this section, we quantitatively compare the models by introducing various types of borrow-
ing constraints into the JQ model. These borrowing constraints can be derived as non-default
conditions, as in JQ. The diﬀerences between these borrowing constraints are based on the
working capital loan settings and liquidation value. The JQ model assumes that a ﬁrm’s work-
ing capital loans are equal to its revenue (output) and constrained by the liquidation value of
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the physical capital remaining after the deduction of long-term debt stock. We modify this
assumption and consider the borrowing constraint on ﬁnancing only the portion of revenue
and other speciﬁcations of liquidation value. The borrowing constraints are constructed as
follows:
Borrowing constraint: liquidation value| {z }n
»

k0¡ b0
1+r

; »Em0V 0
o ¸ working capital loan| {z }8><>: wn; i; '; b¡ b
0
R
h1i h2i h3i h4i
9>=>;
We consider the combinations by which the q expenditure items from the set of four expen-
diture items,
fh1iwn; h2i i; h3i'; h4i b¡ b0=Rg, are constrained by borrowing constraints, where q is the
number of constrained variables. The total number of combinations of constrained expen-
diture as working capital loans is
P4
q=1 4!= [q!(4¡ q)!] = 15. In addition, we also consider
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)’s speciﬁcation as a special case in our model. Thus, we consider
16 types of working capital loans. In addition, the liquidation value can be considered in
various ways, such as capital stocks, net worth, ﬁrm’s value, and output. In this paper, we
consider two types of liquidation values, »
³
k0 ¡ b01+r
´
and »Em0V 0. For example, the lat-
ter case is considered by a working paper version of JQ (Jermann and Quadrini, 2009) and
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). Therefore, the total number of borrowing constraint
combinations is 32. Tables 1–2 list out the borrowing constraints. “Model No.” in the tables
identiﬁes each model. When the liquidation value is »
³
k0 ¡ b01+r
´
, the ﬁrst letter of “Model
No.” is labeled as “m.” We call this group of models “m-models.” When the liquidation value
is »Em0V 0, the ﬁrst letter of “Model No.” is labeled as “v.” We call this group of models
“v-models.” For example, the borrowing constraint of m5 is » fk0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)g ¸ wn+ i and
means that the working capital loans for wage payment and investment are constrained by
the liquidation net value of physical capital. The borrowing constraint of m15 is the same as
with equation (1). The FOCs and the steady state of all models are provided in Appendix 8.
In Appendix 9, we investigate the models by their ability to replicate the main statistical
features of US business cycles. In these results, the m04, v04, m07, v07, m09, m10, v10, m13,
v13, m16, and v16 models do not have properties that are needed for business cycle models.3
Especially, ﬁnancial shocks of the model-generated series in these models do not explain the
actual ﬁnancial conditions. In addition, the second moments of the simulated series also fail
to match the actuals. These models show too much volatility and are negatively correlated
3As explained in Section 3.3, we also exclude models m03 and v03.
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Combination Model No. Borrowing constraint
h1i m01 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn
h2i m02 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ i
h3i m03 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ '
h4i m04 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h2i m05 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ i
h1i+h3i m06 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ '
h1i+h4i m07 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ b¡ b0=R
h2i+h3i m08 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ i+ '
h2i+h4i m09 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ i+ b¡ b0=R
h3i+h4i m10 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ '+ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h2i+h3i m11 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ i+ '
h1i+h2i+h4i m12 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ i+ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h3i+h4i m13 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ '+ b¡ b0=R
h2i+h3i+h4i m14 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ i+ '+ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h2i+h3i+h4i m15 » ©k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r)ª ¸ wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0=R
m16 »k0 ¸ b
0
1 + r
Table 1: Borrowing constraints, liquidation value ´ » (k0 ¡ b0=(1 + r))
with the GDP for consumption and investment. However, m16 and v16 do not have suitable
properties for business cycle model, and so we continue to consider the m16 and v16 models
for comparison. Therefore, we conclude that models m04, v04, m07, v07, m09, m10, v10,
m13, and v13 can be excluded from further analysis.
Before conducting numerical experiments, we discuss each constrained variable.
3.1 Working capital loans for wage payments
In this case, we assume that the ﬁrm needs to borrow working capital loans for wage payment
l from intra-period loans. The ﬁrm can default in repayment of intra-period loan wn and
retain a part of the revenue equal to the value of wage payment wn when the ﬁrm decides
to default. This setting is also considered in JQ, Section III-C. Inaba and Kobayashi (2009),
Kobayashi, Nakajima and Inaba (2012), Nutahara (2015), and Kobayashi and Shirai (2016a,b)
also assume that working capital loans are used for wage payments. The borrowing constraint
on ﬁnancing wage payments is important when considering business cycles and ﬁnancial crises.
This ﬁnancial friction distorts the labor market and may lead to LW deterioration when a
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Combination Model No. Borrowing constraint
h1i v01 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn
h2i v02 »Em0V 0 ¸ i
h3i v03 »Em0V 0 ¸ '
h4i v04 »Em0V 0 ¸ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h2i v05 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i
h1i+h3i v06 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ '
h1i+h4i v07 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ b¡ b0=R
h2i+h3i v08 »Em0V 0 ¸ i+ '
h2i+h4i v09 »Em0V 0 ¸ i+ b¡ b0=R
h3i+h4i v10 »Em0V 0 ¸ '+ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h2i+h3i v11 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ '
h1i+h2i+h4i v12 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h3i+h4i v13 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ '+ b¡ b0=R
h2i+h3i+h4i v14 »Em0V 0 ¸ i+ '+ b¡ b0=R
h1i+h2i+h3i+h4i v15 »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0=R
v16 »Em0V 0 ¸ b
0
1 + r
Table 2: Borrowing constraints, liquidation value ´ »Em0V 0
negative shock hits the economy.
3.2 Working capital loans for investment
This constraint limits investment by the ﬁrm and distorts capital allocation. The collateral
constraint of Buera (2009), Buera and Shin (2013), Moll (2014), Buera and Moll (2015), and
Buera, Fattal-Jaef and Shin (2015) limits the amount of capital rental by ratio of ﬁrms’ net
worth. These studies employ the same form of borrowing constraint and assume that house-
holds invest and hold capital stock, ﬁrms accumulate net worth, and rent capital stock is
aﬀected by the borrowing constraint. This type of borrowing constraint relates to the situa-
tion in which investment is aﬀected by the borrowing constraint. These borrowing constraints
deteriorate IW. These studies’ concern is long-term economic development, and they explain
some stylized facts of economic development that are not explained by standard growth mod-
els. Their idea is built by empirical evidence of capital misallocation, for example, see Hsieh
and Klenow (2009).
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3.3 Working capital loans for equity payout
Working capital loans for equity payout is an uncommon setting in this literature except for
Jermann and Quadrini (2012a). The most simplest models in our settings are the m03 and
v03 models whose working capital loans are only for equity payout. The borrowing constraint
for model v03 is
»Em0V 0 ¸ ':
In the steady state, this constraint can be written as4
»¤ =
1
¯
¡ 1:
This result implies that d and b cannot be identiﬁed in equilibrium. Thus, we cannot conduct
numerical simulation for this model.
Equity payout is a required positive value, because the ﬁrm’s value becomes negative when
its equity payout is negative in the steady state. In model m03, proposition 1 implies that
condition d¤=y¤ > 0 is diﬃcult to be satisﬁed.
Proposition 1. Suppose the borrowing constraint is »
³
k0 ¡ b01+r
´
¸ '. If and only if »¤ <
(1¡¯)(1¡¿)
¯[(¯¡1)¿+1] ,
d¤
y¤ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
In the standard setting,5 »¤ = 0:162 is not satisﬁed for condition (1¡¯)(1¡¿)¯[(¯¡1)¿+1] = 0:0116 > »
¤.
In addition, the Blanchard–Kahn conditions are not satisﬁed and there is no stable equilibrium
even when »¤ < (1¡¯)(1¡¿)¯[(¯¡1)¿+1] . We thus cannot conduct a numerical experiment for model m03.
Therefore, we will not consider models v03 and m03 in our further analysis. However, we
do not conclude that working capital loans for equity payout is not a good modeling. We will
show that the combinations of equity payout and other factor(s) are not worse compared to
other combinations.
4The derivation of the borrowing constraint in the steady state is as follows:
»¤¯V ¤ = d¤;
»¤¯
d¤
1¡ ¯ = d
¤;
»¤ =
1
¯
¡ 1:
5See Section 4 for parameter settings.
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3.4 Working capital loans for debt repurchase
Debt repurchase, b ¡ b0=R, is also introduced in the borrowing constraint by Kobayashi and
Shirai (2016b). In this setting, if debt repurchase is required as a working capital loan, the ﬁrm
borrows debt repurchase as a working capital loan to pay the lender of intra-period debt in
order to ﬁx the next-period inter-period debt b0=R. Intuitively, intertemporal debt, b, can be
interpreted as corporate bond. When a ﬁrm redeems her corporate bond from a bondholder,
it would require working capital loans for debt repurchase from a lender to ﬁnance her before
production takes place.
3.5 Debt stock aﬀected by borrowing constraint
We also consider the borrowing constraint on ﬁnancing only intertemporal loan. This setting
is the same as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998). The borrowing constraint is
derived as follows:
»k0
»Em0V 0
)
¸ b
0
1 + r
:
The intertemporal loan is limited by the capital of collateral. In this setting, » represents the
ratio of collateral.
4 Persistence and ampliﬁcation
In this section, we compare persistence and ampliﬁcation, which are important features of
the business cycle, for each model. In particular, we investigate which speciﬁcation of the
borrowing constraint can generate persistence and/or ampliﬁed responses to a transitory
shock. We consider two aggregate shocks, “productivity shocks” and “ﬁnancial shocks,” and
calculate stochastic simulations using log-linearized models.
4.1 Calibration
We conduct numerical simulations using two parameter sets, (i) common parameters among
models and (ii) model-speciﬁc calibrated parameters. We conduct model-speciﬁc calibration
to also investigate for robustness of our results. First, except for the parameters of shock
processes, the parameter values follow JQ, and are given in Table 4.1. To compare them
quantitatively, we assume that the parameter settings are equal among models. ® is chosen
to match the steady-state working hours equal to 0.3, and this value is between 1.75 and 1.99
in each model. Except for a parameter in m02, we use all parameters commonly in numerical
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Parameter Economic interpretation value
¯ the subjective discount factor 0.9825
± the depreciation rate of capital 0.025
· the inverse of the adjustment cost of dividends 0.146
¿ the tax advantage for debt 0.35
µ the share of capital in production 0.36
½z the persistence of productivity shock 0
½» the persistence of ﬁnancial shock 0
n¤ labor supply in the steady state 0.3
»¤ the collateral ratio in the steady state 0.162
z¤ TFP in the steady state 1
Table 3: Exogenous values in the steady state
simulation in this section. We set »¤ = 0:15 in m02 to be a positive value for equity payout
in the steady state.
For TFP and ﬁnancial shocks, we assume no persistency, ½z = ½» = 0, to consider per-
sistence and ampliﬁcation that only depend on the structural model, and not on the shock
process. The standard deviation of each shock is assumed to be a 1% impulse in variable
when calculating the impulse response functions.
4.2 The method of stochastic simulation
In this subsection, we conduct stochastic simulation. The log-linearized dynamic system can
be represented as the state-space representation:
St = FSt¡1 +Qet; t = 0; 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; T; (4)
xt = HSt (5)
where St is the vector of state variables; xt is the vector of control variables; F, Q, and H
are functions of structural parameters; et is the vector of productivity and ﬁnancial shocks,
et = [ez;t e»;t]
0; and T is the number of observations. By substituting (4) for (5),
xt = HFSt¡1 +HQet: (6)
(4) and (6) can be combined with the single matrix equation,"
St
xt
#
=
"
F
HF
#
St¡1 +
"
Q
HQ
#
et:
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We assume that the economy is in the steady state when t = 0. et can be generated by normal
distribution independently.
We deﬁne the persistency of how the periods in an impulse response of output to a shock
converge to the steady state. The value of et is chosen such that the output in period 1 is
lower than the steady state by 1%. We judge convergence when the deviation is less than
0.01%. Ampliﬁcation is measured by the elasticity of output with respect to a shock, such as
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), by calculating the impulse response functions, that is,
ampliﬁcation ´ min y˜t or max y˜t
size of a negative shock (% deviation from the steady state)
;
where y˜t ´ ln(yt)= ln(y¤) is the percentage deviation from the steady state of output and y¤
is the steady-state value of output. We consider a negative shock, but the response of output
to a negative shock is not always negative and depends on the structure of the model. When
the response of output is positive, we calculate ampliﬁcation using the max operator.
4.3 Simulation results
To compare the simulation results quantitatively, we introduce a frictionless RBC economy
as reference for a special case of our model with parameters, the adjustment cost of dividend
· = 0, and the tax advantage of debt ¿ = 0. In this case, ﬁrms do not issue debt because
there is no tax advantage and the borrowing constraint is not binding any more. This model
is identical to the standard RBC model without any adjustment costs and friction. However,
the model does not work when · = 0 and ¿ = 0 because of indeterminacy between b and d.
Therefore, we omit b in the frictionless RBC model. The frictionless RBC model is described
in Appendix 6.
Table 4 shows persistence of output and ampliﬁcation.6 The ﬁrst column gives the “Model
No.,” which is already deﬁned in Table 1-2. We label the frictionless RBC model as “RBC.”
The second column gives the “constrained variables”; these comprise the necessary working
capital ﬁnance before production begins in each model and are aﬀected by the borrowing
constraint.
From this table, all classes of borrowing constraints do not generate a strong ampliﬁed
response to a shock relative to the standard RBC model.7 Roughly speaking, m-models and
6We also apply stochastic simulations to persistence shocks and set the persistence parameter values of
shocks equal to 0.5; that is, ½z = ½» = 0:5. However, this modiﬁcation has little eﬀect on ampliﬁcation and
does not change our conclusion.
7In an extreme parameter settings, model m14 can generate strong ampliﬁcation. This result is based on a
particular combination of parameters at the edge of the parameter space. This result is similar to the ﬁnding
of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004).
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Persistence Ampliﬁcation
constrained variables ez e» ez e»
RBC 15 NaN 1.717 NaN
m01 wn 14 6 1.096 0.396
m02 i 39 32 1.579 0.245
m05 wn+ i 40 19 0.622 0.360
m06 wn+ ' 12 13 1.570 0.107
m08 i+ ' 35 50 1.487 0.041
m11 wn+ i+ ' 38 31 1.281 0.168
m12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 12 38 1.207 0.308
m14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 7 16 1.903 -0.111
m15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 33 7 0.293 0.881
m16 b0=(1 + r) 16 10 1.574 -0.545
Persistence Ampliﬁcation
constrained variables ez e» ez e»
RBC 15 NaN 1.717 NaN
v01 wn 15 6 1.072 0.406
v02 i 27 27 1.257 0.071
v05 wn+ i 31 19 0.992 0.239
v06 wn+ ' 12 12 1.568 0.110
v08 i+ ' 22 40 1.527 0.035
v11 wn+ i+ ' 28 36 1.319 0.151
v12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 8 35 1.259 0.265
v14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 22 29 1.452 0.178
v15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 38 6 0.191 0.932
v16 b0=(1 + r) 15 3 1.610 -0.165
Table 4: Persistence and ampliﬁcation of output: ½ = 0, common parameters among models
Note: Persistence is deﬁned as the number of convergence periods in response to a shock that decreases output
by 1% from the steady state. We judge convergence when the deviation is less than 0.01%. Ampliﬁcation is
deﬁned as the elasticity of output to a shock.
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Figure 1: Persistence versus Ampliﬁcation
Note: Persistence is deﬁned as the number of convergence periods in response to a shock that decreases output
by 1% from the steady state. We judge convergence when the deviation is less than 0.01%. Ampliﬁcation is
deﬁned as the elasticity of output to a shock.
v-models exhibit a similar tendency between persistence and ampliﬁcation. The setting of
liquidation value may not be important. Some models generate a somewhat large ampliﬁcation
compared to the RBC model, but these diﬀerences are quantitatively very small. These results
are similar to the ﬁndings of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004). As shown by Kocherlakota (2000)
and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), the ampliﬁcation and persistence of the Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) model crucially depend on the special functional form. When the functional forms of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) change to standard settings, ampliﬁcation and persistency become
weak. The Kiyotaki–Moore-type models (m16 and v16) replicate the result of Cordoba and
Ripoll (2004) and are not much diﬀerent from the RBC model.
Since Cordoba and Ripoll (2004), many studies have explored the mechanism to amplify
shocks. For example, Mendoza (2010) and Inaba and Kobayashi (2009) show that the working
capital loan channel can generate ampliﬁcation. However, these results are in contrast to our
ﬁndings. The borrowing constraints of our models also limit working capital loans but do not
generate strong ampliﬁcation. Several diﬀerences exist between their models and ours, but
this result implies that the working capital loan channel does not always generate ampliﬁed
response to a shock.
Table 4 also shows the trade-oﬀ relationship between ampliﬁcation and persistence in the
models. Figure 1 plots the results of Table 4. In general, our models show that when the
output responses indicate strong persistence to shocks, ampliﬁcation becomes weak. This
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result is also similar to the ﬁnding of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) of a trade-oﬀ relationship in
output in the parameter space using the generalized Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model.8
In the case of a simple investment-constrained model (m02 and v02), output shows a rel-
atively strong persistence response to productivity shock without decreasing ampliﬁcation.
Figure 2 shows an impulse response function to productivity and ﬁnancial shocks. The tran-
sitory negative productivity shock decreases output and relaxes the borrowing constraint,
because the demand of working capital loans decrease. Tightness of the borrowing constraint
is shown by the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint ¹. In period 1, ¹ decreases
in response to a negative productivity shock, implying relaxation of the borrowing constraint.
To show this, the borrowing constraint of m02 is rewritten as follows using (2):
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ zkµn1¡µ ¡ wn¡ '+ b
0
R
¡ b:
The right-hand side of z decreases in response to a negative productivity shock and the
borrowing constraint loosens. The ﬁrm borrows more debt for investment following relaxation
of the borrowing constraint, although the debt cannot decrease immediately even after z
returns to the pre-shock level, and the borrowing constraint persistently tightens. From this
result, the ﬁrm cannot obtain suﬃcient working capital for investment and the problem of
insuﬃcient capital stock continues. In this result, the output response to productivity shock
is persistent. Next, we evaluate this mechanism through the lens of BCA; the Euler equations
for capital stock is
Em0
'd(d)
'd0(d0)
½
(1¡ ±) £1 + 'd0(d0)¹¤+ µy0
k0
¾
= 1 + (1¡ »)'d(d)¹;
where the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint ¹ and the term 1+'d(d)¹ determine
the IW. The persistence response of output is generated by IW. This ﬁnding is consistent
with Inaba and Nutahara (2009). They ﬁnd that the role of IW is to delay the propagation
of productivity shocks in the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) economy; the borrowing constraint
of their model also limits investment. Without relying on the structure of the shock process,
ﬁnancial friction can generate persistency.
This ﬁnding relates to Buera and Shin (2013). They quantitatively analyze the develop-
ment dynamics using a heterogeneous agents model with ﬁnancial friction. Their borrowing
constraint limits the ﬁnance capital stock. They ﬁnd that slower transition dynamics, which
are the observed growth experiences of economic miracles, can be explained by ﬁnancial fric-
tion. Such persistence partially depends on IW deterioration.
8Pintus (2011) ﬁnds that a low-risk aversion can cause ampliﬁcation and persistence. However, their results
cannot generate strong ampliﬁcation and the elasticity of output with respect to TFP shock is not greater than
1.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to one-time productivity and ﬁnancial shocks for investment-
constrained model (m02)
Note: The standard deviation of each shock is assumed to be a 1% impulse in the variable.
A negative ﬁnancial shock also leads to persistence of output, but the response of output
inverts the sign from negative to positive after period 2. In period 1, a negative ﬁnancial
shock hits the economy, the borrowing constraint becomes more tight, and investment, debt,
and output decrease. In the next period, the ﬁnancial condition returns to the steady state
and the borrowing constraint is relaxed due to decreasing debt. In this result, the increase
in investment and accumulating capital stock relax the borrowing constraint more. Thus,
a negative ﬁnancial shock decreases output temporarily, but after some periods, the output
increases persistently.9 This persistence is also generated by IW.
The wage payment-constrained models (m01 and v01) show nearly the same persistence
with a frictionless RBC model. However, the combination of wage payment and investment
(m06 and v06) increases the persistence slightly. The other combination depresses the persis-
tence, except for v15. From Figure 3, the main force of the persistence response of output to
a productivity shock comes from LW. IW still contributes to persistence, but it is quantita-
9The positive response of output to a negative ﬁnancial shock after some periods disappears, when the
shock process becomes highly persistent.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to one-time productivity and ﬁnancial shocks for wage payment
and investment-constrained model (m05)
Note: The standard deviation of each shock is assumed to be a 1% impulse in the variable.
tively very small. This result implies that the combination of wage payment and investment
has a complementary relationship and IW causes the spillover eﬀect of LW in the m06 and
v06 model. This ﬁgure also shows why only ﬁnancial friction does not amplify the shock. In
the aftermath of a productivity shock, wedges counterfactually respond to the shock due to
borrowing constraints and partially cancel out the eﬀect of the shock.10 If wage payment,
investment, and equity payout are constrained (m11 and v11), ampliﬁcation becomes more
strong than in the m05 and v05 models, although persistence becomes a little weak.
4.4 Robustness and the hump-shaped response of output
In this subsection, we assess the robustness of the results by computing the same numerical
simulations using model-speciﬁc calibrated parameters. Table 5 gives the calibrated param-
eters. More details of the calibration strategy are shown in Appendix 9. Table 6 gives the
simulation results and is basically identical to Table 4. Investment-constrained and wage
payment-constrained models are still important to generate persistence. We conﬁrm that
10In the case of ﬁnancial shock, the shock does not directly aﬀect output.
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m01 m02 m05 m06 m08 m11 m12 m14 m15 m16
® 1.856 1.889 1.868 1.875 1.806 1.776 1.871 1.921 1.883 1.920
»¤ 0.092 0.041 0.140 0.109 0.089 0.248 0.145 0.064 0.162 0.371
· 0.065 0.105 0.125 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.290 0.052 0.000
½» 0.981 0.927 0.969 0.974 0.945 0.977 0.975 0.881 0.973 0.989
¾» 0.012 0.047 0.017 0.009 0.026 0.014 0.010 0.020 0.009 0.010
v01 v02 v05 v06 v08 v09 v11 v12 v14 v15 v16
® 1.857 1.881 1.864 1.876 1.912 1.902 1.877 1.871 1.927 1.883 1.920
»¤ 0.093 0.032 0.131 0.117 0.056 0.042 0.155 0.140 0.067 0.164 0.593
· 0.061 0.087 0.094 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.087 0.051 0.000
½» 0.981 0.927 0.970 0.973 0.926 0.855 0.966 0.975 0.884 0.973 0.989
¾» 0.012 0.061 0.018 0.009 0.033 0.028 0.015 0.010 0.020 0.009 0.010
Table 5: Parameter settings
our results are robust. Ampliﬁcation becomes relatively weak and inversely relates to persis-
tence. Kiyotaki–Moore-type borrowing constraints (m16 and v16) generate highly persistent
response to ﬁnancial shock but nearly zero ampliﬁcation.
This table also gives the hump-shaped response of output. We measure the hump-shaped
response as when the impulse response to a negative shock reaches the bottom. Shirai (2014)
shows that the hump-shaped response of output requires a highly persistent shock process in
the frictionless RBC model. The persistence of productivity shock is calibrated as ½z = 0:9378;
this parameter is too small when the standard RBC model generates the hump-shaped output
response. As is well known, the standard RBC model has weak endogenous propagation
mechanisms,11 and an additional mechanism is required.12 We examine whether ﬁnancial
friction has propagation mechanisms. Interestingly, although the most persistent models are
investment-constrained ones (m02 and v02), these models do not generate the hump-shaped
response. On the other hand, a combination with investment and other variable(s) (m05,
v05, m12, v12, v14, m15, and v15) generate the hump-shaped response. This hump-shaped
response is generated by the countercyclical response of IW and LW that are enhanced by the
spillover eﬀect. Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions for wage payment, investment,
and the debt repurchase-constrained model (m12). The hump-shaped response of output
11See Cogley and Nason (1995).
12For example, the habit formation of consumption and human capital accumulation enhance the propagation
mechanism. See Fuhrer (2000) and Chang, Gomes and Schorfheide (2002).
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Persistence Ampliﬁcation Hump-shape
constrained variables ez e» ez e» ez e»
m01 wn 94 138 1.057 0.344 3 1
m02 i 114 88 0.927 0.103 1 1
m05 wn+ i 103 103 0.866 0.310 6 1
m06 wn+ ' 85 190 1.505 0.028 1 1
m08 i+ ' 101 127 1.452 -0.002 1 5
m11 wn+ i+ ' 105 142 1.299 0.067 1 1
m12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 107 97 0.659 0.882 7 1
m14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 88 63 1.728 -0.196 1 1
m15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 94 83 1.118 0.612 5 1
m16 b0=(1 + r) 87 444 1.508 0.028 1 18
Persistence Ampliﬁcation Hump-shape
constrained variables ez e» ez e» ez e»
v01 wn 94 145 1.068 0.296 3 1
v02 i 118 106 1.025 0.082 1 1
v05 wn+ i 102 125 0.964 0.206 2 1
v06 wn+ ' 85 183 1.504 0.029 1 1
v08 i+ ' 95 100 1.473 0.029 1 1
v09 i+ b¡ b0R 97 134 1.291 0.086 1 1
v11 wn+ i+ ' 91 77 1.310 0.092 1 1
v12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 101 110 0.882 0.573 2 1
v14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 102 18 1.167 0.273 3 1
v15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 94 91 1.105 0.499 5 1
v16 b0=(1 + r) 87 444 1.508 0.018 1 18
Table 6: Persistence and ampliﬁcation of output: model-speciﬁc calibrated parameters
Note: Persistence is deﬁned as the number of convergence periods in response to a shock that decreases output
by 1% from the steady state. We judge convergence when the deviation is less than 0.01%. Ampliﬁcation is
deﬁned as the elasticity of output to a shock. Hump shape is measured as the period of bottom on impulse
response after the shock is realized.
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to a productivity shock is generated by the countercyclical response of IW and LW. In this
model, the borrowing constraint limits not only investment but also wage payment and debt
repurchase and these strengthen the countercylicality of IW and LW.
The response to ﬁnancial shock does not cause the hump-shaped response of output.
Models m08, m16, and v16 generate the hump-shaped response, but these ampliﬁcations are
nearly zero. The big diﬀerence between the model-speciﬁc calibrated results in this subsection
and the results with common parameters of models in the previous subsection is the ﬁnancial
shock. In this subsection, the response of output to a ﬁnancial shock monotonically converges
to the steady state. This response crucially depends on the persistence parameter of ﬁnancial
shock ½».
We already showed that the main driving forces of the ﬁnancial crisis are TFP and LW.
However, these ﬁgures show that it is diﬃcult for a negative productivity shock to replicate
LW deterioration. In period 1, when the shock realizes, LW responds countercyclically to a
productivity shock, but after some periods, LW becomes pro-cyclical. However, a suﬃciently
persistent ﬁnancial shock can replicate LW deterioration soon after a shock is realized. Ac-
cording to our models, ﬁnancial crises are considered to be due to both negative productivity
shocks and negative persistent ﬁnancial shocks.
5 Conclusion
After the Great Recession, the global economy continues to suﬀer from stagnation. To explain
this, we need to understand the mechanism of ﬁnancial crisis. In this paper, we considered
various forms of borrowing constraints to investigate which of the borrowing constraints gen-
erate persistent and/or ampliﬁed output responses to a productivity and ﬁnancial shock using
a simple business cycle model with ﬁnancial friction. Speciﬁcally, we consider how ﬁnancial
friction can replicate business cycle factors without multiple friction or shocks.
We ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ relationship between persistence and ampliﬁcation in the models.
When a relatively strong persistence is generated, ampliﬁcation becomes weak. In addition,
ﬁnancial friction alone does not generate a stronger ampliﬁcation than the standard RBC
model. However, even if a transitory shock is assumed, some models can generate persistence.
In particular, investments aﬀected by the borrowing constraint model have an important role.
When ineﬃcient capital stock continues, it leads to the tightened borrowing constraint and
generates persistence of output. IW is caused by the borrowing constraint limiting the working
capital ﬁnance for investment. In addition, the interaction between IW and LW strengthens
the propagation mechanism. We can conclude that IW and LW have an important role in
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to one-time productivity and ﬁnancial shocks for wage payment,
investment, and debt repurchase-constrained model (m12)
Note: The standard deviation of each shock is assumed to be a 1% impulse in the variable.
generating persistence and the propagation mechanism.
Appendices
6 Appendix: Frictionless model economy
When we assume that · = 0 and ¿ = 0, b and d cannot be identiﬁed in equilibrium. We
modify the model by excluding b to solve the model.
A ﬁrm’s problem is
V = max
©
d+ Em0V 0
ª
;
s:t: (1¡ ±) + y ¡ wn = d+ k0:
The FOCs are
k : Em0
µ
1¡ ± + µ y
0
k0
¶
= 1;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
:
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A household’s problem is
max
c; n; b0; s0
E0
1X
t=0
¯t [ln c+ ® ln(1¡ n)] ;
s:t: wn+ s(d+ p) = s0p+ c:
The FOCs are
c : ¸ =
1
c
;
n : w =
®c
1¡ n:
This model is identical to the standard RBC model.
7 Appendix: BCA for the JQ economy
In this appendix, we describe the prototype model to measure the wedges.
The representative household solves
max
c; n; b0; s0
E0
1X
t=0
¯t [ln c+ ® ln(1¡ n)] ;
subject to
(1¡ ¿n)wn+ s(d+ p) = s0p+ c;
where (1¡ ¿n) is LW. The FOCs are
c : ¸ =
1
c
;
n : (1¡ ¿n)w = ®c1¡ n:
The ﬁrm solves
V (s; k) = max
d;n;k0
©
d+ Em0V (s0; k0)
ª
;
subject to
F (z; k; n)¡ wn = '(d) + (1 + ¿x)[k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k];
where 1=(1 + ¿x) is IW. The FOCs are
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k0 : Em0
'd(d)
'd0(d0)
©
(1¡ ±)(1 + ¿ 0x) + Fk0(z0; k0; n0)
ª
= 1 + ¿x:
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We summarize the three wedges below:
LW : (1¡ ¿n) = MRS
MRL
=
®c
1¡ n
(1¡ µ)y
n
;
EW : z =
y
kµn1¡µ
;
IW :
1
1 + ¿x
= E
'd0(d0)
m0'd(d)
8<:
1
1+¿ 0x
1¡ ± + Fk0 (z0;k0;n0)1+¿ 0x
9=; :
Since EW follows an exogenous shock process, we mainly focus on LW and IW.
8 Appendix: System of dynamics and the steady state
8.1 The benchmark case: m15
8.1.1 System of dynamics
The system of dynamics of the benchmark model is summarized below:
Households
w =
®c
1¡ n; (7)
1
c(1 + r)
= E0
¯
c0
: (8)
Firms
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ y; (9)
w =
(1¡ µ)(1¡ ¹'d(d))y
n
; (10)
Em0
'd(d)
'd0(d0)
½
1¡ ± + £1¡ ¹0'd0(d0)¤ µy0
k0
¾
+ »¹'d(d) = 1; (11)
REm0
'd(d)
'd0(d0)
+ »¹'d(d)
R
1 + r
= 1; (12)
V = d+ Em0V 0; (13)
(1¡ ±)k + y ¡ wn+ b
0
R
= b+ '(d) + k0; (14)
y = F (z; k; n) = zkµn1¡µ; (15)
'(d) = d+ ·(d¡ d)2; 'd(d) = 1 + 2·(d¡ d); (16)
m0 =
¯C
C 0
; (17)
R = 1 + r(1¡ ¿): (18)
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Shocks
ln z0 = ½z ln z + (1¡ ½z) ln z + ez; (19)
ln »0 = ½» ln » + (1¡ ½») ln » + e»: (20)
The resource constraint
(1¡ ±)K + Y ¡K 0 ¡ C = '(D)¡D: (21)
8.1.2 Steady state
The steady-state values of the benchmark model are obtained by
n¤ = 0:3;
(19) : z¤ = 1;
(20) : »¤ = »;
(8) : r¤ =
1
¯
¡ 1;
(18) : R¤ = 1 + r¤(1¡ ¿);
(12) : ¹¤ =
1
»¤
µ
1
¯R¤
¡ 1
¶
;
(17) : m¤ = ¯ =
1
1 + r¤
;
(11) : k¤ =
·
(1¡ ¹¤)µ¯z¤
1¡ »¤¹¤ ¡ ¯(1¡ ±)
¸ 1
1¡µ
n¤;
(15) : y¤ = z¤k¤µn¤ 1¡µ;
(21) : c¤ = y¤ ¡ ±k¤;
(7) : ® =
w¤(1¡ n¤)
c¤
;
(10) : w¤ =
(1¡ µ)(1¡ ¹¤)y¤
n¤
;
(9) : b¤ =
1
¯
µ
k¤ ¡ y
¤
»¤
¶
;
(14) : d¤ = y¤ ¡ ±k¤ ¡ w¤n¤ + b¤
µ
1
R
¤
¡ 1
¶
;
(16) : '(d¤) = d¤; 'd(d¤) = 1;
(13) : V ¤ =
d¤
1¡ ¯ :
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8.2 m01: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn;
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
1 + r
= 1:
8.3 m02: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ i;
where i ´ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k.
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
¡ (1¡ »)¹
!
= 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
1 + r
= 1:
8.4 m03: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ '
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ ':
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The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.4.1 Steady state
BC : »¤ (k¤ ¡ ¯b¤) = d¤
d : !¤ = 1¡ ¹¤;
n : w¤ = (1¡ µ)y
¤
n¤
;
k : k¤ =
·
(1¡ ¹¤)µ¯z¤
1¡ ¹¤(1 + »¤)¡ ¯(1¡ ±)(1¡ ¹¤)
¸ 1
1¡µ
n¤ =
·
¯2µR¤z¤
2R¤¯ ¡ ¯2R(1¡ ±)¡ 1
¸1
1¡ µn
b : ¹¤ =
1¡ ¯R¤
¯R¤(»¤ ¡ 1) + 1 ()
»¤¹¤
1¡ ¹¤ =
1
¯R¤
¡ 1
Proposition 1:
Proof. In the steady state, the borrowing constraint can be rewritten:
b¤
y¤
=
»¤k¤ ¡ d¤
¯»¤y¤
:
A ﬁrm’s ﬂow of funds is:
d¤ = y¤ ¡ ±k¤ ¡ w¤n¤ +
µ
1¡R¤
R¤
¶
b¤:
Using the steady state relationship and divide by y¤, the ﬂow of funds can be rewritten:
d¤
y¤
=
·
µ ¡ k
¤
y¤
µ
± ¡ 1¡R
¤
R¤¯
¶¸
| {z }
ª
µ
¯»¤R¤
¯»¤R¤ + 1¡R¤
¶
> 0:
»¤ is the only free parameter and used to adjust the steady state value to ﬁt the observational
data. » does not appear in the ﬁrst square bracket on the right hand side. This term is
negative constant and can be ignored to consider the condition d¤=y¤ > 0. The sign of the
second bracket is determined by »¤ in the denominator. Hence, the condition of d¤=y¤ > 0 is
determined by
» <
R¤ ¡ 1
¯R¤
=
(1¡ ¯)(1¡ ¿)
¯ [(¯ ¡ 1)¿ + 1] ;
where R¤ = 1 + r¤(1¡ ¿) and r¤ = 1=¯ ¡ 1.
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8.5 m04: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
¹
!
µ
»R
1 + r
¡ 1
¶
= 1:
8.6 m05: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn+ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn+ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
'd
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
(» ¡ 1) = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.7 m06: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn+ '
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn+ ':
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The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.8 m07: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
¹
!
µ
»R
1 + r
¡ 1
¶
= 1:
8.9 m08: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k + '
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ i+ ':
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± +
µ
1¡ ¹
0
!0
¶
µy0
k0
¸
¡ ¹
!
» = 1;
b : (1¡ »¹)REm0!
0
!
+
¹
!
+
¹»R
!(1 + r)
= 1:
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8.10 m09: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k + b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ i+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ) y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
'd
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
(» ¡ 1) = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
¹
!
µ
»R
1 + r
¡ 1
¶
= 1:
8.11 m10: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ '+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ '+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
¹
!
µ
»R
1 + r
¡ 1
¶
= 1:
8.12 m11: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn+ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k + '
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn+ i+ ';
where i ´ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k.
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The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
¡ ¹
!
» = 1;
b : (1 + »¹)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.13 m12: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn+ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k + b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn+ i+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
n : w = (1¡ µ)
³
1¡ ¹
!
´ y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·µ
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¶µ
1¡ ¹
0
!0
¶¸
+ (1¡ »)¹
!
= 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.14 m13: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ wn+ '+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ wn+ '+ b¡ b
0
R
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
¹
!
µ
»R
1 + r
¡ 1
¶
= 1:
32
8.15 m14: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k + '+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ i+ '+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± +
µ
1¡ ¹
0
'd
¶
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.16 m15: »
¡
k0 ¡ b0
1+r
¢ ¸ y
The borrowing constraint is
»
µ
k0 ¡ b
0
1 + r
¶
¸ y:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd(d)
;
n : w =
(1¡ µ) ¡1¡ ¹!¢ y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± +
µ
1¡ ¹
0
!0
¶
µy0
k0
¸
+ »
¹
!
= 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+ »
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.17 m16: »k0 ¸ b0
1+r
The borrowing constraint is
»k0 ¸ b
0
1 + r
:
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The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd(d)
;
n : w =
(1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
µ
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¶
+ »
¹
!
= 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
+
¹
!
R
(1 + r)
= 1:
8.18 v1: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn;
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.19 v2: »Em0V 0 ¸ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ i;
where i ´ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k.
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ) y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
¡ ¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
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8.20 v3: »Em0V 0 ¸ '
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ ':
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.20.1 Steady state
BC : » =
1¡ ¯
¯
= r¤
d : !¤ = 1¡ ¹¤;
n : w¤ = (1¡ µ) y
¤
n¤
;
k : k¤ =
·
(1 + ¹¤»¤)µ¯z¤
1¡ ¯(1¡ ±)(1 + ¹¤»¤)
¸ 1
1¡µ
n¤;
b : ¹¤ =
1
»¤
µ
1
¯R¤
¡ 1
¶
:
In this model, b and d can not be identiﬁed.
8.21 v4: »Em0V 0 ¸ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
¡ ¹
!
= 1:
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8.22 v5: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
'd
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.23 v6: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ '
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ ':
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.24 v7: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ b¡ b
0
R
:
36
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
¡ ¹
!
= 1:
8.25 v8: »Em0V 0 ¸ i+ '
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ i+ ':
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w = (1¡ µ) y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1¡ ¹
0
!0
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
¡ ¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.26 v9: »Em0V 0 ¸ i+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ i+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
'd
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
¡ ¹
!
= 1:
37
8.27 v10: »Em0V 0 ¸ '+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ '+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
¡ ¹
!
= 1:
8.28 v11: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ '
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ ';
The FOCs of a ﬁrm
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1¡ ¹
0
!0
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
¡ ¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + »¹)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.29 v12: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ i+ b¡ b
0
R
:
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The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
'd
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
¡ ¹
!
= 1:
8.30 v13: »Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ '+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ wn+ '+ b¡ b
0
R
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
¡ ¹;
n : w =
1¡ µ
1 + ¹!
y
n
;
k : Em0
!0
!
·
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
» = 1;
b : REm0
!0
!
µ
1 +
¹0
!0
¶
+
¹
!
µ
»R
1 + r
¡ 1
¶
= 1:
8.31 v14: »Em0V 0 ¸ k0 ¡ (1¡ ±)k + '+ b¡ b0
R
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ i+ '+ b¡ b
0
R
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd
;
n : w = (1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
·
(1¡ ±)
µ
1 +
¹0
'd
¶
+
µy0
k0
¸
+
¹
!
= 1;
b : (1 + ¹»)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
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8.32 v15: »Em0V 0 ¸ y
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ y:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd(d)
;
n : w =
(1¡ µ) ¡1¡ ¹!¢ y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
½
1¡ ± +
·
1¡ ¹
0
!0
¸
µy0
k0
¾
= 1;
b : (1 + »¹)REm0
!0
!
= 1:
8.33 v16: »Em0V 0 ¸ b0
1+r
The borrowing constraint is
»Em0V 0 ¸ b
0
1 + r
:
The FOCs of a ﬁrm:
d : ! =
1
'd(d)
;
n : w =
(1¡ µ)y
n
;
k : (1 + ¹»)Em0
!0
!
½
1¡ ± + µy
0
k0
¾
= 1;
b : (1 + »¹)REm0
!0
!
+
¹R
(1 + r)!
= 1:
9 Appendix: Business cycle properties
In this section, we investigate the models by their ability to replicate the main statistical
features of US business cycles. First, we construct the TFP and ﬁnancial conditions ». » vary
among models because » is constructed by each borrowing constraint. Second, we calibrate
the productivity shocks and ﬁnancial shocks of every model. Third, using the constructed
series of shocks, we calculate the stochastic simulation to compare the ability to replicate
actual data. Thus, it becomes clear that some models can replicate the usual business cycle
properties; we focus on these models in Section 4.
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9.1 Constructing TFP z and ﬁnancial conditions »
TFP is constructed as the standard Solow residuals. The production function is assumed to be
the Cobb–Douglas function, and we log-linearize around the steady state. The log-linearized
production function is
y˜ = z˜ + µk˜ + (1¡ µ)n˜;
where x˜ = (lnx¡ lnx¤)= lnx¤ and x¤ is the steady-state value of the corresponding variable.
The Solow residuals can be taken from
z˜ = y˜ ¡ µk˜ ¡ (1¡ µ)n˜:
When constructing the Solow residuals, y˜; k˜ and n˜ are the used data in logs linearly detrended
over the period 1984:I-2010:II. Data deﬁnition depends on Jermann and Quadrini (2012b)13.
All data are in real terms and linearly detrended over the period 1984:I-2010:II. The calibration
target is also 1984:I-2010:II.
Financial conditions » are also constructed similarly with the Solow residuals using bor-
rowing constraints. In this paper, we consider various forms of borrowing constraints; this
means that the observed ﬁnancial conditions and ﬁnancial shocks vary among models. To un-
derstand this clearly, we construct ﬁnancial conditions using the m15 model. The ﬁrst-order
log-linear approximation on the borrowing constraint of m15 around the steady state is
»˜ = y˜ ¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e;
where be ´ b0=(1 + r). The series of »˜ are also taken as residuals. As for all m-models, the
log-linearized borrowing constraints are listed in Appendix 10.1, and we obtain »˜ in the same
way. Following the working paper version of JQ,14 the v-models are also the equations used
in Appendix 10.1 for each corresponding model between the m-models and v-models, because
it is diﬃcult to choose data for V˜ in the aggregate level in v-models. For example, when
we conduct numerical simulation for v05, we use the ﬁnancial shocks of m05. Note that the
steady-state values of the variables are diﬀerent between the m-models and v-models. Thus,
the constructed series of ﬁnancial conditions in the m05 model are diﬀerent from v05.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the constructed series of ﬁnancial shocks e» for each model. The
ﬁgures also plot the “Credit-Standard.” Credit-Standard represents the net tightening of
credit standards for the United States; a positive value represents the ratio of banks that
tightened their credit standards over the past three months. We compare the ﬁnancial shocks
13The dataset is available on JQ’s online appendix. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.238.
14See Jermann and Quadrini (2009) p.16 footnote 4.
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Parameter Economic interpretation value
¯ the subjective discount factor 0.9825
± the depreciation rate of capital 0.025
¿ the tax advantage for debt 0.35
µ the share of capital in production 0.36
½z the persistence of productivity 0.9378
¾z the standard deviation of productivity 0.0045
m01 m02 m04 m05 m06 m07 m08 m09 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15 m16
® 1.86 1.89 2.08 1.87 1.88 1.86 1.81 2.08 1.92 1.78 1.87 1.77 1.92 1.88 1.92
»¤ 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.25 0.14 0.20 0.06 0.16 0.37
· 0.07 0.11 100 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 100 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.05 0.00
½» 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.88 0.97 0.99
¾» 0.01 0.05 0.71 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
v01 v02 v04 v05 v06 v07 v08 v09 v10 v11 v12 v13 v14 v15 v16
® 1.86 1.88 1.98 1.86 1.88 1.87 1.91 1.90 1.98 1.88 1.87 1.88 1.93 1.88 1.92
»¤ 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.59
· 0.06 0.09 4.95 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.06 0.00 2.64 0.09 0.05 0.00
½» 0.98 0.93 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.86 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.88 0.97 0.99
¾» 0.01 0.06 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Table 7: Parameter settings
and the actual credit standards data to investigate each ﬁnancial shocks and indicate the credit
tightness reasonably well. We also calculate the correlation between (sign reversed) ﬁnancial
shocks and the Credit-Standard. The ﬁnancial shocks of m04, m07, m09, m10, m13, m16,
v04, v07, v10, v13, and v16 are negatively correlated with actual data and do not replicate
the actuals. Other ﬁnancial shocks indicate fairly good results to explain actual data.
9.2 Calibration
In this section, we recalibrate ﬁve parameters, utility parameter ®, enforcement parameter »¤,
adjustment cost of equity payout ·, and the parameters for the stochastic process of ﬁnancial
conditions », ½» and ¾». Parameters ·, ½», and ¾» depend on the constructed series of ﬁnancial
shocks, which are diﬀerent for each model. ® is chosen to match the steady-state working
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Figure 5: Financial conditions of m-models
Note: R ´ corr(¡e»; Credit-Standard). Credit-Standard represents the net tightening of credit standards for
the United States (Firm size: large and medium).
Source: Credit-Standard: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Prac-
tices.
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Figure 6: Financial conditions of v-models
Note: R ´ corr(¡e»; Credit-Standard). Credit-Standard represents the net tightening of credit standards for
the United States (Firm size: large and medium).
Source: Credit-Standard: Federal Reserve Board, Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Prac-
tices.
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c¤ w¤ k¤ ¹¤ v¤ y¤ b
¤
y¤
¡
1¡ 1R¤
¢
d¤=y¤ b¤=y¤ i¤ LW ¤ IW ¤
m01 0.82 2.17 10.70 0.07 7.18 1.09 0.04 0.12 3.36 0.27 0.94 1.17
m02 0.78 2.12 8.32 0.15 6.35 0.99 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.21 1.00 1.00
m04 0.84 2.49 13.12 0.71 0.41 1.17 0.07 0.01 6.40 0.33 1.00 1.33
m05 0.81 2.16 9.89 0.04 6.90 1.06 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.25 0.96 1.11
m06 0.82 2.19 10.70 0.05 6.79 1.09 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.27 0.95 1.17
m07 0.82 2.18 10.90 0.07 7.10 1.09 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.27 0.94 1.19
m08 0.74 1.90 6.16 0.06 7.56 0.89 0.04 0.15 3.36 0.15 1.00 0.82
m09 0.84 2.49 13.12 0.71 0.41 1.17 0.07 0.01 6.40 0.33 1.00 1.33
m10 0.80 2.19 9.15 0.01 0.74 1.03 0.12 0.01 7.89 0.23 1.00 1.06
m11 0.75 1.89 6.53 0.02 8.19 0.91 0.04 0.16 3.36 0.16 0.98 0.85
m12 0.81 2.17 10.00 0.04 6.84 1.06 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.25 0.96 1.12
m13 0.75 1.90 6.71 0.03 8.30 0.92 0.04 0.16 3.36 0.17 0.97 0.87
m14 0.80 2.19 9.14 0.10 5.80 1.03 0.04 0.10 3.36 0.23 1.00 1.06
m15 0.81 2.18 10.07 0.04 6.62 1.06 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.25 0.96 1.13
m16 0.80 2.19 9.12 0.01 5.82 1.03 0.04 0.10 3.36 0.23 1.00 1.06
Table 8: Steady-state values in m-models
hours equal to 0.3. »¤ is the steady-state level of ﬁnancial conditions » and targets the debt-to-
output ratio (nonﬁnancial business sector) equal to 3.36 on average between 1984:I-2010:II.
· does not appear in the steady state and only appear in the transition dynamics. Only
· cannot be set with a steady-state target. Therefore, · is chosen to match the standard
deviation of equity payout-to-output ratio d=y between data and model. · is discussed more
in Section 9.3.
Next, we construct productivity shocks and ﬁnancial shocks. We assume that z and »
follow the independent AR(1) process, respectively:15
ln z0 = ½z ln z + (1¡ ½z) ln z + ez;
ln »0 = ½» ln » + (1¡ ½») ln » + e»:
½» are estimated by least squares for each model. ½z are common for all models. Thus, the
15JQ assumes that z and » follow the VAR(1)"
z˜0
»˜0
#
= A
"
z˜0
»˜0
#
+
"
e0z
e0»
#
process and this setting implies that z and » mutually aﬀect each other. The structural model does not show
why the two shocks mutually aﬀect each other.
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c¤ w¤ k¤ ¹¤ v¤ y¤ b
¤
y¤
¡
1¡ 1R¤
¢
d¤=y¤ b¤=y¤ i¤ LW ¤ IW ¤
v01 0.82 2.17 10.69 0.07 7.16 1.09 0.04 0.12 3.36 0.27 0.94 1.17
v02 0.78 2.10 8.10 0.19 6.48 0.98 0.04 0.12 3.36 0.20 1.00 0.98
v04 0.82 2.32 10.69 0.68 4.68 1.09 0.04 0.08 3.36 0.27 1.00 1.17
v05 0.81 2.16 9.94 0.05 6.98 1.06 0.04 0.12 3.36 0.25 0.95 1.12
v06 0.82 2.19 10.69 0.05 6.78 1.09 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.27 0.95 1.17
v07 0.82 2.18 10.69 0.06 6.94 1.09 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.27 0.94 1.17
v08 0.79 2.17 8.90 0.11 5.96 1.02 0.04 0.10 3.36 0.22 1.00 1.04
v09 0.79 2.15 8.64 0.15 6.14 1.01 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.22 1.00 1.02
v10 0.82 2.32 10.69 0.23 4.68 1.09 0.04 0.08 3.36 0.27 1.00 1.17
v11 0.81 2.17 10.03 0.04 6.72 1.06 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.25 0.96 1.12
v12 0.81 2.17 9.99 0.04 6.83 1.06 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.25 0.96 1.12
v13 0.82 2.20 10.69 0.05 6.63 1.09 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.27 0.95 1.17
v14 0.80 2.20 9.31 0.09 5.69 1.03 0.04 0.10 3.36 0.23 1.00 1.07
v15 0.81 2.18 10.06 0.04 6.61 1.06 0.04 0.11 3.36 0.25 0.96 1.13
v16 0.80 2.19 9.12 0.00 5.82 1.03 0.04 0.10 3.36 0.23 1.00 1.06
Table 9: Steady-state values in v-models
series of productivity shocks ez and ﬁnancial shocks e» are constructed. In the following, the
simulation, ez, and e» are treated as exogenously given.
Table 7 reports the values of the calibrated parameters.
Tables 8–9 report the steady-state values for all models. Table 8 shows that the debt-
to-output ratio b¤=y¤ of m04, m09, and m10 do not match the observed ratio. For m04 and
m09, when calibrating the steady-state ﬁnancial condition by trying to match the observed
debt-to-output ratio, the steady-state equity payout becomes negative. We assume that the
equity payout is positive in the steady state, and so »¤ is chosen to have a positive value for
equity payout in the steady state. In model m10, »¤ = 0:12 is the argument of the minima of
b¤=y¤, that is, »¤ = argmin»¤f
³
b¤
y¤
´
= 0:12, and b¤=y¤ cannot decrease any more.
On the other hand, Table 9 shows that all v-models match the observed debt-to-output
ratio.
9.3 Simulation results
In this subsection, we again conduct the stochastic simulation already explained in Section 4.2.
Instead of using the shocks generated by normal distribution, we use the shocks constructed
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in Section 9.1.
Tables 10–11 report the standard deviation for actual data and model-generated series.16
The adjustment cost of equity payout · is calibrated to match the standard deviation of
the equity payout/output ratio between the actual data and generated data by each model.
However, this cannot match models m04, m08–m10, m12, m14, m16, v07-v10, v12, and v16.
Tables 10–11 show that the models including credit-constrained debt repurchase m04, m07,
m09, m10, v10, v13, and v16 generate too volatile macro aggregate output, consumption, and
investment. Note that the standard deviation of investment for models v04, v08, v10, v11,
and v16 are almost zero. Other models show roughly similar results with the standard RBC
model. Most models do not generate volatility of working hours. McGrattan and Prescott
(2010) emphasize that the basic neoclassical growth model greatly understates the 1990s
boom. To explain this, we need to include some kind of mechanism to explain the 1990s
boom. For example, Jermann and Quadrini (2007) propose that the 1990s boom can be
explained by the stock market boom.
Tables 12–13 report the correlation between output and various other variables. In models
m04, m09, and m10, the correlation of consumption with output is negative. In models v01,
v04, v07, v10, and v11, the correlation of investment is negative. In model m07, the correlation
of consumption and investment is very weak and working hours are negatively correlated with
output. In addition, in models m02, m05, v02, v04, v10, and v13, consumption is too weakly
correlated with output. These features are undesirability for a model to replicate business
cycle ﬂuctuations.
To summarize these calibration and simulation results, we conclude that m04, v04, m07,
v07, m09, m10, v10, m13, v13, m16, and v16 are irrelevant to replicate actual business cycles.
However, the Kiyotaki–Moore borrowing constraints (m16, v16) are also irrelevant, but we
do not exclude them when comparing other models. Therefore, in Section 4, we exclude the
m04, v04, m07, v07, m09, m10, v10, m13, and v13 models.
16Note that the equity payout/output ratio and debt repurchase/output ratio represent percentages. To
represent the percentage point deviation from their steady-state values, these two variables are deﬁned as
follows:
Equity-payout ´ EquPay =

d˜¡ y˜
 d¤
y¤
;
Debt-repurchase ´ DebtRep =

R¤
R¤ ¡ 1

b˜¡ 1
R¤

b˜0 ¡ R˜

¡ y˜

b¤
y¤

1¡ 1
R¤

:
These expressions denote the percentage point deviation from the steady state and the ﬁnancial ﬂows of tables
are calculated using the above equations.
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Constrained var. y c i n EquPay DebtRep TFP w
Data 0.022 0.023 0.120 0.033 0.029 0.043 0.013 0.024
RBC 0.021 0.011 0.067 0.009 0.010 NaN 0.013 0.014
m01 wn 0.019 0.010 0.055 0.013 0.029 0.039 0.013 0.013
m02 i 0.019 0.021 0.097 0.016 0.029 0.044 0.013 0.018
m04 b¡ b0R 0.845 1.014 4.921 1.142 0.742 0.445 0.013 0.613
m05 wn+ i 0.018 0.014 0.077 0.018 0.029 0.046 0.013 0.012
m06 wn+ ' 0.021 0.012 0.062 0.009 0.022 0.021 0.013 0.014
m07 wn+ b¡ b0R 0.022 0.033 0.080 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.036
m08 i+ ' 0.021 0.012 0.077 0.009 0.025 0.020 0.013 0.014
m09 i+ b¡ b0R 0.269 0.319 1.562 0.362 0.237 0.139 0.013 0.192
m10 '+ b¡ b0R 0.054 0.065 0.353 0.063 0.034 0.040 0.013 0.047
m11 wn+ i+ ' 0.020 0.012 0.066 0.007 0.029 0.030 0.013 0.014
m12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 0.027 0.015 0.103 0.034 0.009 0.032 0.013 0.020
m13 wn+ '+ b¡ b0R 0.022 0.014 0.073 0.016 0.029 0.041 0.013 0.020
m14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 0.020 0.013 0.077 0.012 0.110 0.109 0.013 0.014
m15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 0.020 0.011 0.065 0.013 0.029 0.040 0.013 0.013
m16 b0=(1 + r) 0.021 0.012 0.068 0.010 0.033 0.031 0.013 0.014
Table 10: Standard deviation
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Constrained var. y c i n EquPay DebtRep TFP w
Data 0.022 0.023 0.120 0.033 0.029 0.043 0.013 0.024
RBC 0.021 0.011 0.067 0.009 0.010 NaN 0.013 0.014
v01 wn 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.029 0.038 0.013 0.013
v02 i 0.022 0.023 0.107 0.017 0.029 0.044 0.013 0.019
v04 b¡ b0R 0.022 0.022 0.000 0.021 0.029 0.011 0.013 0.017
v05 wn+ i 0.018 0.013 0.059 0.014 0.029 0.040 0.013 0.013
v06 wn+ ' 0.021 0.012 0.062 0.009 0.022 0.021 0.013 0.014
v07 wn+ b¡ b0R 0.024 0.062 0.145 0.026 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.069
v08 i+ ' 0.021 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.026 0.024 0.013 0.014
v09 i+ b¡ b0R 0.022 0.013 0.079 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.014
v10 '+ b¡ b0R 0.049 0.052 0.000 0.049 0.040 0.025 0.013 0.039
v11 wn+ i+ ' 0.019 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.029 0.031 0.013 0.013
v12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 0.022 0.012 0.075 0.022 0.007 0.026 0.013 0.015
v13 wn+ '+ b¡ b0R 0.180 0.040 0.692 0.279 0.029 0.291 0.013 0.135
v14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 0.023 0.013 0.087 0.014 0.029 0.041 0.013 0.014
v15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 0.020 0.011 0.063 0.012 0.029 0.039 0.013 0.013
v16 b0=(1 + r) 0.021 0.012 0.000 0.010 0.022 0.019 0.013 0.014
Table 11: Standard deviation
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Constrained var. y c i n EquPay DebtRep TFP w
Data 1.000 0.886 0.643 0.721 0.199 -0.439 0.205 0.302
RBC 1.000 0.830 0.933 0.867 -0.867 NaN 0.993 0.944
m01 wn 1.000 0.765 0.927 0.585 0.146 -0.318 0.865 0.878
m02 i 1.000 0.361 0.648 0.509 -0.060 -0.171 0.681 0.628
m04 b¡ b0R 1.000 -0.536 0.895 0.851 -0.905 -0.738 -0.196 -0.208
m05 wn+ i 1.000 0.347 0.821 0.619 0.307 -0.452 0.670 0.796
m06 wn+ ' 1.000 0.761 0.928 0.867 -0.411 0.006 0.995 0.911
m07 wn+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.628 0.302 0.679 -0.687 -0.200 0.993 0.672
m08 i+ ' 1.000 0.857 0.925 0.865 -0.490 0.173 0.985 0.952
m09 i+ b¡ b0R 1.000 -0.544 0.898 0.855 -0.907 -0.743 -0.169 -0.214
m10 '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 -0.127 0.767 0.692 -0.860 -0.471 0.086 0.222
m11 wn+ i+ ' 1.000 0.888 0.922 0.834 -0.230 -0.024 0.961 0.959
m12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.453 0.911 0.788 -0.336 -0.748 0.479 0.930
m13 wn+ '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.877 0.905 0.739 0.168 -0.421 0.896 0.910
m14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.523 0.858 0.759 0.081 -0.177 0.944 0.809
m15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.742 0.932 0.723 0.309 -0.480 0.900 0.905
m16 b0=(1 + r) 1.000 0.784 0.925 0.849 -0.384 0.106 0.988 0.928
Table 12: Correlation
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Constrained var. y c i n EquPay DebtRep TFP w
Data 1.000 0.886 0.643 0.721 0.199 -0.439 0.205 0.302
RBC 1.000 0.830 0.933 0.867 -0.867 NaN 0.993 0.944
v01 wn 1.000 0.773 -0.034 0.575 0.081 -0.259 0.890 0.877
v02 i 1.000 0.392 0.657 0.517 -0.181 -0.111 0.678 0.655
v04 b¡ b0R 1.000 0.055 -0.721 0.689 -0.572 0.048 0.405 0.437
v05 wn+ i 1.000 0.617 0.823 0.533 0.060 -0.235 0.810 0.888
v06 wn+ ' 1.000 0.762 0.928 0.869 -0.397 -0.006 0.995 0.911
v07 wn+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.659 -0.198 0.581 -0.689 -0.219 0.969 0.676
v08 i+ ' 1.000 0.818 0.829 0.824 -0.520 0.217 0.982 0.936
v09 i+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.677 0.898 0.815 -0.554 -0.770 0.943 0.887
v10 '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.022 -0.288 0.683 -0.911 0.014 0.304 0.397
v11 wn+ i+ ' 1.000 0.836 -0.159 0.751 -0.351 0.110 0.963 0.942
v12 wn+ i+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.605 0.906 0.677 0.200 -0.638 0.720 0.926
v13 wn+ '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.390 0.987 0.987 0.711 -0.976 0.115 0.990
v14 i+ '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.491 0.894 0.817 0.242 -0.479 0.945 0.816
v15 wn+ i+ '+ b¡ b0R 1.000 0.754 0.931 0.720 0.252 -0.433 0.914 0.904
v16 b0=(1 + r) 1.000 0.797 0.793 0.856 -0.450 0.029 0.992 0.933
Table 13: Correlation
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10 Appendix: Data construction
10.1 Constructing ﬁnancial shocks
We construct ﬁnancial shocks with respect to each model using the following log-linearized
borrowing constraints:
m1: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
1¡ µ
1 + ¹¤
(w˜ + n˜)¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m2: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
±k¤
y¤
i˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m4: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
y˜ ¡ (1¡ µ) (w˜ + n˜)¡ ±k
¤
y¤
i˜¡ d
¤
y¤
d˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m5: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
1¡ µ
1 + ¹¤
(w˜ + n˜) +
±k¤
y¤
i˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m6: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
(1¡ ¹¤)(1¡ µ) (w˜ + n˜) + d
¤
y¤
d˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m7: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
y˜ ¡ ±k
¤
y¤
i˜¡ d
¤
y¤
d˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m8: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
±k¤
y¤
i˜+
d¤
y¤
d˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m9: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
y˜ ¡ (1¡ µ) (w˜ + n˜)¡ d
¤
y¤
d˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m10: »˜ =
1
µ ¡ ±k¤y¤
½
y˜ ¡ (1¡ µ) (w˜ + n˜)¡ ±k
¤
y¤
i˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m11: »˜ =
1
»¤(k¤¡¯b¤)
y¤
½
(1¡ ¹¤)(1¡ µ) (w˜ + n˜) + d
¤
y¤
d˜+
±k¤
y¤
i˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m12: »˜ =
1
1¡ d¤y¤
½
y˜ ¡ d
¤
y¤
d˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
m13: »˜ =
1
1¡ ± k¤y¤
½
y˜ ¡ ±k
¤
y¤
i˜¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m14: »˜ =
1
µ
½
y˜ ¡ (1¡ µ) (w˜ + n˜)¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e
¾
;
m15: »˜ = y˜ ¡ »
¤k¤
y¤
k˜0 +
¯»¤b¤
y¤
b˜e:
where be ´ b0=(1 + r).
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